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Abstract 
Threat image projection (TIP) is a technology of current x-ray machines that 
allows exposing screeners to artificial but realistic x-ray images during the 
routine baggage x-ray screening operation. If a screener does not detect a TIP 
within a specified amount of time, a feedback message appears indicating that a 
projected image was missed. Feedback messages are also shown when a TIP 
image is detected or in the case of a non-TIP alarm, i.e. when the screener 
indicated that there was threat but in fact no TIP was shown. TIP data is an 
interesting source for quality control, risk analysis and assessment of individual 
screener performance. In two studies we examined the conditions for using TIP 
data for the latter purpose. Our results strongly suggest using aggregated data in 
order to have a large enough data sample as the basis for statistical analysis. 
Second, an appropriate TIP library containing a large number of threat items, 
which are representative for the prohibited items to be detected is recommended. 
Furthermore, consideration should be given to image-based factors such as 
general threat item difficulty, viewpoint difficulty, superposition and bag 
complexity. Different methods to cope with these issues are discussed in order to 
achieve reliable, valid and standardized measurements of individual screener 
performance using TIP. 
Keywords: Airport security, human factors, threat image projection, detection 
performance, reliability analysis, hit rate, false alarm rate 
1 Introduction 
The task of an airport security screener is to visually inspect passenger bags for 
forbidden or dangerous objects. In order to perform this task effectively, a 
screener needs to know which items are prohibited and what they look like in x-
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ray images of passenger bags. As pointed out by Schwaninger [1], some threat 
objects look very different in an x-ray image than in reality. Other prohibited 
items are difficult to identify in an x-ray image because they look similar to 
harmless objects. Because of these and other reasons, training and visual 
experience are essential in order to achieve and maintain a high level of detection 
performance (Schwaninger [2]; Schwaninger [3]; Schwaninger & Hofer [4]). 
In addition to such knowledge-based factors of expertise and training, there are 
several image-based factors, which also influence detection performance 
(Schwaninger [5]; Schwaninger, Hardmeier, & Hofer [6]). When prohibited 
items are rotated they can become more difficult to recognize (effect of 
viewpoint). Superimposition by other objects in the bag can also affect detection 
performance (effect of superposition). In addition, the number and type of other 
objects can affect the visual search for prohibited items (effect of bag 
complexity). Interestingly, comparable effects of these image-based factors on 
detection performance have been found for novices as well as for experts. 
Moreover, large inter-individual differences were found in the ability to cope 
with these image-based factors, which accounted for novices as well as for 
experts. Thus, these image-based factors seem to be rather related to relatively 
stable visual abilities than to training and visual experience. 
The fact that image- and knowledge-based factors strongly influence detection 
performance points out that the effectiveness of aviation security technology is 
limited by the abilities and expertise of the humans that operate it. Therefore, 
reliable and valid procedures for assessing individual detection performance of 
screeners are relevant for quality control, risk analysis and screener certification 
purposes. 
Large technological progress has been made in aviation security in the last two 
decades. One relatively new technology is threat image projection (TIP). This is 
a software function of state-of-the art x-ray machines that allows measuring of 
detection performance on the job. In TIP, virtual threat images are projected 
randomly on x-ray screening systems. For cabin baggage screening (CBS), 
fictional threat items (FTIs) are projected into x-ray images of real passenger 
bags in a random position. In hold baggage screening (HBS), combined threat 
images (CTIs) are displayed, i.e. virtual x-ray images of whole bags that can 
contain threat items. The use of CTIs is not possible in cabin baggage screening, 
because x-ray operators see the passengers and their luggage. Since in many hold 
baggage screening systems the operators are isolated from the passengers, it is 
possible to use CTIs in HBS TIP.  
If a screener detects the projected threat item within a predefined time, the 
answer counts as hit. Missing a TIP-image counts as miss. Non-Tip alarms are 
registered in CBS if a screener gives a threat present response when no TIP 
image was shown. In some HBS systems not only threat x-ray images but also 
non-threat x-ray images of passenger bags are shown. In this case, false alarms 
as well as correctly judging bags to be harmless are also written into TIP report 
files. Feedback messages are always presented to the screener when a TIP-image 
has been shown or in the case of a non-TIP alarm (CBS) or a false alarm (HBS). 
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TIP data is an interesting source for quality control, risk analysis and assessment 
of individual screener performance. Especially for the latter purpose, reliability 
of measurement is of special importance. This was examined in two studies 
using CBS and HBS data, respectively. 
2 CBS Study 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 TIP Library 
A standard TIP library based on FAA [7] was used, which is available on current 
TIP systems. A TIP:bag ratio of 1:50 was used in this study. 
2.1.2 Participants 
333 CBS airport security screeners took part in this study. They were all 
familiarized with the same TIP library using generic logins for several weeks 
before the study was started using individual logins. The study was conducted 
over a period of 7 months. 
2.1.3 Analyses 
There are different ways to estimate reliability. The most common procedures 
are test-retest, split-half, alternate forms and internal consistency analyses (for an 
overview see for example Kline [8]; Murphy & Davidshofer [9]). Because in 
both CBS and HBS current TIP software selects the threat items on a purely 
random basis, there can be quite substantial differences in repeated exposure to 
different items between screeners. It is therefore not possible to run the same TIP 
projections for every screener. This complicates reliability analyses because it 
implies that neither of the common reliability procedures can be applied in its 
pure form. 
For the purpose of this study, two ways of data splitting were conducted: First, 
the hit rate of even days was correlated with the hit rate of odd days. Aggregated 
data was used, which was collected over a period of seven months. Second, the 
hit rate from one, two and three successive months was correlated with the hit 
rate of the following one, two and three months, respectively. For both ways of 
data splitting, some items can be in both halves, whereas some other items are 
only found in one of the two halves (varying across participants). Therefore, the 
reliability analyses in this study are a combination of split-half and test-retest 
reliability. 
Psychophysical measures such as d’ or A’ are more valid estimates of detection 
performance than the hit rate alone (Hofer & Schwaninger [10]; MacMillan & 
Creelman [11]; Green & Swets [12]). These measures take the hit and false 
alarm rate into account. In this study, all reliability analyses were done only with 
the hit rate due to the following reasons: First, it is not possible to get a valid 
false alarm rate from CBS TIP reports because the individual non-TIP alarm rate 
does not completely match the individual false alarm rate. If a screener detects a 
real threat in a bag when no TIP image is present, this is recorded as a non-TIP 
 WIT Transactions on The Built Environment, Vol 82, © 2005 WIT Press 
 www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3509 (on-line) 
420  Safety and Security Engineering 
alarm in the TIP report. In this case the response should count as a (true) hit and 
certainly not as a false alarm. Second, because correctly judging a bag to be 
harmless is not written into the CBS TIP report, the individual non-TIP alarm 
rate has to be estimated based on the averaged TIP to bag ratio, which can further 
reduce the internal validity of the estimates. Therefore, only the hit rate was 
analyzed as a measure of performance. Non-TIP alarm rates (CBS) and false 
alarm rates (HBS) are reported here to illustrate differences between individuals 
in their response tendencies. 
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Correlations between hit rates of even and odd days 
Figure 1 shows the correlations between the hit rates of even and odd days, 
aggregated over different numbers of months and averaged between the 
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Figure 1.  Correlations between even and odd days, aggregated over different 
numbers of months. Error bars represent standard deviations. 
days was relatively small and clearly below .40, even if TIP data from seven 
months were used. The mean even-odd day correlation for data of one month 
was r = .19, over seven months r = .33. It is important to note that the hit rate 
was very high and also very stable for all numbers of months (not shown in 
Figure 1). Moreover, the standard deviations were very small. These results 
suggest that most screeners achieved ceiling performance already in the first 
weeks when generic logins were used prior to the data collection for this study 
(see also section 2.1.2). 
1 Separate results for each category (guns, knives and IEDs) are very similar to 
the overall result and therefore not reported here. 
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2.2.2 Correlations between the hit rate of consecutive months 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the correlations for data of two, four and six successive 
months, calculated by correlating the hit rate between the first and second month, 
the hit rate between the first two and second two months, and the hit rate 
between the first three and second three months. 
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Figure 2.  Correlations between the hit rate of the first and second month (1), 
 of the first two and second two months (2), and of the first three 
 and second three months (3). 
Correlation varied between r = .32 and r = .58. Thus, splitting the CBS data 
between different months resulted in higher correlations than splitting the data 
into even and odd days. 
2.2.3 Individual non-TIP alarm rates 
As can be seen in Figure 3, non-TIP alarms varied substantially between 
individual screeners. We found 0% for the screener with the lowest and 19% for 
the screener with the highest non-TIP alarm rate. 
2.3 Discussion 
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rs Figure 3. Distribution of 
individual non-TIP alarm rates 
(averaged over the 7 months 
period for each screener). 
The correlations for the CBS TIP data of the standard TIP library available on 
conventional x-ray screening systems were clearly below .4 when splitting the 
data into even and odd days. When splitting the data between consecutive 
months, the correlations were higher, but still too small to conclude that this data 
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is reliable enough for individual performance assessment (all r < = .58). Note 
however, that the hit rate was very high and stable over different months. In 
addition, very small standard deviations were observed. Thus, a ceiling effect in 
the data and small inter-individual differences could have resulted in small 
reliability coefficients. 
The non-TIP alarm rate varied substantially between individual screeners, which 
3 HBS Study 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 TIP library 
S TIP consisted of 1028 combined threat images (CTIs). 
3.1.2 Participants 
urity screeners participated in this study. They were all 
3.1.3 Analyses 
 as for CBS was used to assess the reliability of HBS TIP data. 
reflects differences in response bias. Since the hit rate is dependent on individual 
response biases, its validity for measuring detection performance in terms of 
sensitivity is reduced. 
The library used for HB
64 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were selected by police experts from a 
large x-ray image database in order to create a representative sample of different 
IED types. Each IED was combined with 8 bags of different difficulties rated by 
8 x-ray screening experts. Each bag was also displayed without the IED. Thus, 
the whole HBS TIP library consisted of 64 IEDs * 8 difficulty levels * 2 
(harmless vs. dangerous bags) = 1028 CTIs. A TIP:bag ratio of 1:30 was used in 
this study. 
74 HBS airport sec
familiarized with TIP using individual logins several weeks before the individual 
measurement started. The TIP images used in the introductory phase were 
different from the ones used for the reliability analyses. The study was conducted 
over a period of 16 months. 
The same method
Again, correlations between the hit rate of even and odd days for different 
numbers of months were calculated and correlations between the hit rates of 
several successive months were computed. 
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3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Correlations between data of even and odd days 
Figure 4 shows the mean correlations between even and odd days aggregated 
over one month (r = .70) up to 16 months (r = .94). The hit rates (not shown in 
Figure 4) were smaller than in study 1. Moreover, much larger standard 
deviations were observed now. 
3.2.2 Correlations between the hit rate of consecutive months 
igure 5 shows the reliability coefficients calculated by correlating the hit rate 
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Figure 4.  Correlations between even and odd days, aggregated over different 
 numbers of months. Error bars represent standard deviations. 
 
F
between the first and second month, the first two and the following two months, 
the first three and the following three months etc.  
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Aggregation (months)
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
co
ns
ec
ut
iv
e 
m
on
th
s
Figure 5.  Correlations between the hit rates aggregated over different numbers 
 of consecutive months. 
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The correlation between the hit rate of the first two months was r = .60, the 
correlation between the first eight and the following eight months was r = .75. 
 
3.2.3 Individual false alarm rates 
As explained in the method section, in this study half of all TIPs were harmless 
bags whereas the other CTIs contained an IED. Figure 6 shows the distribution 
of false alarm rates based on TIP trials containing a harmless bag (averaged for 
each screener over the 16 months period). 
3.3 Discussion 
Figure 6. Distribution of 
individual false alarm rates from 
non-threat TIP trials (averaged 
across all 16 months for each 
participant). 
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Compared to the CBS TIP data, much higher correlations were revealed for the 
HBS TIP library used in this study. The correlation between even and odd days 
was .70 for data aggregated over one month and > .8 when data were aggregated 
over three months. For data aggregated over 6 or more months, the correlation 
between hit rates of even and odd days was > .9. When correlating the hit rate 
between different numbers of consecutive months, correlations were still quite 
high, although less high than when splitting the data into even and odd days. 
Again, as for the CBS data, screeners vary substantially in their response bias, 
which was reflected by the variation in the false alarm rate of the HBS TIP data. 
Since the hit rate is affected by response bias, this result questions the validity of 
the hit rate for measuring detection performance in terms of sensitivity. 
4 General Discussion 
Threat image projection is a technology of current x-ray machines that allows 
exposing screeners to artificial but realistic x-ray images during the routine 
baggage x-ray screening operation. Because TIP allows realistic on the job 
measurement, it could be a useful tool for assessing individual screener x-ray 
detection performance. To this end, the measurement has to fulfil international 
standards of testing, i.e. the method used needs to be reliable, valid, objective 
and standardized. In this study, we analyzed TIP data from CBS and HBS in 
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order to investigate reliability. Current TIP software allows only random 
projection of images. Since common reliability procedures need a standardized 
and controlled item set, they cannot be applied in their pure form. Therefore, we 
used a mixture between split-half and test-retest methods to estimate TIP data 
reliability. Data splitting was done in two different ways: The hit rate of even 
and odd days was correlated, while aggregating data over different numbers of 
months. Second, reliability was estimated by computing the correlation between 
the hit rate of consecutive months, e.g. the correlation between the first and 
second, the first two and second two, the first three and second three months, etc. 
In the first study, the standard CBS TIP library was used, which is available on 
conventional x-ray screening systems. We found very low reliability values (all r 
<=.58), even for data aggregated over seven months. This is true for both data 
splitting methods used in this study. Although in general, splitting the data into 
different numbers of successive months resulted in slightly larger correlation 
coefficients as when splitting data into even and odd days. It is important to note 
that the hit rate was very high and only a small inter-individual variance was 
observed. 
In the second study, a more difficult image library was used in HBS. The 
correlation between even and odd days is already .70 for data aggregated over 
one month. For data aggregated over 6 or more months, the correlation is > .9. 
When correlating the hit rate between different numbers of consecutive months, 
correlations are still quite high, although lower than when correlating even and 
odd days. Compared to the CBS data of study 1, the hit rate of the HBS TIP data 
was not at ceiling, and larger standard deviations could be observed. 
What reasons could account for the fact that reliability of CBS data was so low 
while reliability coefficients were much higher for HBS data? One reason for the 
low reliability of CBS data could be a ceiling effect and the small inter-
individual differences. When using TIP for individual performance assessment a 
large image library containing a representative sample of items of varying 
difficulty should be used. At least from a testing psychology standpoint it could 
also be considered to eliminate the most easy and most difficult items. Another 
reason for the higher reliability of HBS TIP data could be related to the 
differences in the TIP system. In HBS, combined threat images are used, i.e. the 
threat item is shown always with the same bag, embedded at the same position. 
Therefore, any effects of superposition and bag complexity are kept constant. In 
CBS, only the threat items are projected into x-ray images of real passenger 
bags. This induces much additional variance of image difficulty because luggage 
varies in terms of bag complexity. Moreover, depending on the randomly 
selected location of the FTI, large differences in superposition are found. 
Therefore, it remains to be seen, whether reliable data can be obtained using 
CBS TIP. We are currently investigating this in a study using a larger CBS TIP 
library that contains more difficult threat items. 
This study also showed that there are substantial inter-individual differences in 
non-TIP alarm rates (CBS) and false alarm rates (HBS). This indicates 
differences in response bias, which also affects the validity of hit rates as a 
measure of detection. It certainly would be desirable to design TIP systems in 
 WIT Transactions on The Built Environment, Vol 82, © 2005 WIT Press 
 www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3509 (on-line) 
426  Safety and Security Engineering 
which a valid measure of false alarm rate can be obtained so that more valid 
detection measures such as d’ and A’ can be derived from hits and false alarms 
(Hofer & Schwaninger [10]; MacMillan & Creelman [11]; Green & Swets [12]). 
This is already possible today in HBS TIP because CTIs are used and harmless 
bags can be projected in order to obtain valid false alarm estimates. In CBS this 
is not possible because FTIs are projected into x-ray images of real passenger 
bags. When a screener detects a real threat item, a non-TIP alarm is recorded, 
even though in this case it is a (true) hit and certainly not a false alarm. By 
separately recording these cases more valid hit and false alarm rates could be 
calculated. The true hits would simply be added to the hits obtained in TIP, the 
false alarm rate would equal the non-TIP alarms minus the true hits. Based on 
corrected hit and false alarm rates it would be possible to calculate d’ or A’ 
scores, which are more valid detection measures than the hit rate alone. 
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